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Introduction
A basic goal of the European Union is to create an integrated European economy where the free flows of goods, services and factors of production are not distorted by national economic policies. Ever since the inception of the EU, it has been recognized that differences in national tax systems may cause a misallocation of resources within the Union. To eliminate such tax-induced distortions, the European Commission, as well as several independent experts, have repeatedly called for various forms of tax coordination within the EU. However, although the Commission has had some success in alleviating international double taxation in the sphere of corporate taxation (mainly via the Parent-Subsidiary directive and the Interest and Royalties directive), none of the more ambitious proposals for harmonisation or coordination mentioned above have been adopted by the EU Member States.
2 By identifying some fundamental dilemmas for EU tax coordination, the present study may help to explain why progress on coordination has been so slow. Thus we show that while the EU-wide economic gains from tax harmonisation arise from differences in the national tax systems, these differences also imply that some Member States are bound to lose from harmonisation. Given the current unanimity rule for tax policy decisions in the EU, harmonisation is therefore unlikely to occur unless the winners can somehow compensate the losers. But this raises another dilemma: According to our analysis the countries experiencing gains in GDP and welfare will also tend to lose tax revenue as a result of tax harmonisation, whereas Member States suffering a loss of GDP and welfare will actually tend to gain additional tax revenue. Hence it seems unlikely that the governments of the former countries will be willing and able to transfer resources to the governments of the latter countries.
Our analysis is based on an elaborate computable general equilibrium model comprising all the 25 current Member States of the EU plus ten additional countries representing the rest of the world. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first study to undertake a quantitative analysis of tax coordination in the enlarged European Union, accounting for economic interactions between the EU and the rest of the world, and allowing for a rich variety of assets and alternative tax instruments.
Thus the present study extends previous quantitative studies of tax coordination in the EU based on more aggregated and stylized models, such as the papers by Tesar (1998, 2005) , Sørensen (2000 Sørensen ( , 2001a Sørensen ( , 2004a Sørensen ( , 2004c ) and Bettendorf et al. (2006) . 3 The next main section describes our simulation model, and section 3 lays out the various scenarios for tax coordination to be considered. Section 4 presents and discusses the simulated effects of alternative policy scenarios. Our main conclusions are summarized in section 5 which also raises some caveats. The appendix provides a more detailed documentation of our results.
The model
Our evaluation of policy scenarios for tax coordination is based on CETAX, a simulation model building on the OECDTAX model developed by Peter Birch
Sørensen (Sørensen, 2001b; 2004b ). The OECDTAX model was constructed specifically for the purpose of studying international coordination of capital income taxation. It has already been applied to a range of policy issues such as corporate tax harmonization in the EU, corporate tax reform in Germany and shifts between corporate taxes and taxes on labour (Sørensen, 2002; 2004a; 2004b Moreover, unlike our model, the CORTAX model assumes that the EU cannot affect the international returns on stocks and bonds, and it abstracts from the housing market, financial institutions, labour market imperfections and tax havens. 4 The other OECD countries included in the model are Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States.
5 These transactions costs are now calibrated on a bilateral country-by country basis in order to generate a more realistic pattern of cross-country investment in debt instruments.
General model features 6
The CETAX model is a CGE model describing the international spill-over One country in the ROW is a tax haven that facilitates tax evasion. Each country produces the same homogeneous good, which is traded in an integrated international goods market. Labour is immobile across countries, whereas capital is imperfectly mobile. The supply of capital to an individual country is thus an increasing function of the rate of return offered in that country. By parametrically varying the elasticity of substitution between assets invested in different countries, one can vary the degree of capital mobility and approximate a situation of perfect mobility. The model is specifically designed to allow for higher capital mobility within the EU than between the EU and the ROW.
Households
Households in each country must choose between immediate and postponed consumption, and the utility-maximising consumer increases his total saving as the after-tax real rate of return increases. Hence the total supply of capital is endogenous.
Having optimized his total saving, the consumer divides his funds between investment in housing equity and financial saving. In the next step, he allocates financial saving between institutional saving and 'household saving'. Household saving includes direct household purchases of stocks and debt instruments, including bank deposits. Institutional saving incorporates financial saving channelled through pension funds and life insurance companies, plus pension savings via the banking and corporate sectors.
In a subsequent step, household financial saving is allocated between stocks and interest-bearing assets, denoted 'bonds' for convenience. Each of these two aggregates must then be allocated between domestic and foreign assets which in turn must be allocated between assets issued in the EU region and assets issued in the ROW. In the final stage, the portfolio is split into assets issued in the individual countries. The institutional savings are allocated across similar asset types in a similar manner.
In addition to supplying capital (savings) to the domestic and international capital markets, households supply labour to domestic and international firms operating in the domestic economy. Wages and working hours are set by trade unions whose market power generates involuntary unemployment. By incorporating labour market imperfections, the model thus addresses the concern of policy makers that a possible shift of the tax burden towards labour may cause more (involuntary) unemployment.
Firms
Businesses are modelled as either purely domestic firms with no methods used to alleviate the domestic and international double taxation of corporate income.
Calibration
A general equilibrium in CETAX is established when households and trade unions maximise their utilities, firms maximise profits, and all national markets for bonds and stocks are clearing.
The simultaneity of the model means that most endogenous variables depend on all model parameters, but some parameters can be assigned the task of generating realistic values of certain endogenous variables (see Sørensen, 2001b . 8 An implication of using 2001 as the base year is that German corporate tax revenues are somewhat lower than normal due to once-off effects in that year. As a result, the calibrated rate of depreciation for tax purposes becomes artificially high for Germany in the model baseline. With Germany being an outlier in terms of its relative level of corporate tax revenues already at more normal levels, however, the calibration is unlikely to affect any policy conclusions. The source of all model elasticities is Sørensen (2002 Sørensen ( , 2004b . Table 2 reports selected elasticities in the model. The substitution elasticities between different types of assets and the international transaction cost parameters have been chosen to generate realistic patterns of portfolio composition. The elasticities generate an equilibrium where interest rate differentials are relatively small across the OECD, as empirically observed, but the calibration of investor preferences also reproduces the observed home bias in investor portfolios.
Table 2. Selected model elasticities

Parameter
Value Elasticity of saving with respect to the after-tax rate of return 0.2 Elasticity of labour supply with respect to the after-tax wage rate 0.2 Elasticity of substitution between housing assets and financial assets 1 Elasticity of substitution between household saving and institutional saving 1 Elasticity of substitution between stocks and bonds 4 Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic stocks held by households 3.5 Elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic bonds held by households 4
Source: Sørensen (2002 Sørensen ( , 2004b .
Policy scenarios
Tax coordination encompasses a wide range of possible tax instruments and coordination policies. The following sections describe the three scenarios of harmonisation of tax rates and tax bases considered in this study. A baseline provides a benchmark for the scenario analysis. The baseline equilibrium includes all current tax policies in the field of direct taxation in the EU25.
Full harmonisation
Our first policy scenario is highly ambitious, envisaging full harmonisation of corporate tax bases and tax rates in the EU25 with the purpose of eliminating all corporate tax distortions to the cross-country pattern of investment. A harmonised tax rate implies that all Member States apply the same statutory rate which is imposed equally on retained and distributed profits. A harmonised tax base means that all Member States adopt the same rules for calculating the corporate tax bases in their respective territories. The broadness of the tax base in the model is determined by the rate of capital depreciation and the proportion of interest payments that may be deducted against taxable corporate income. The scenario with full harmonisation creates a harmonised tax base across the EU25 by assuming that the capital allowance rate and the proportion of deductible interest payments will be identical for all Member States. All parameters other than the statutory corporate tax rate, the capital allowance rate and the deductible fraction of interest payments are assumed to be unchanged compared to the baseline scenario.
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The harmonised tax rates and tax bases are calculated as an average across the EU25. In one version of the scenario an unweighted average applies, and in a second version a GDP-weighted average is considered.
Tax base harmonisation
As a compromise between full tax harmonisation and unfettered tax competition, some participants in the European policy debate have proposed to harmonise the corporate tax base while leaving Member States free to choose their own preferred statutory corporate tax rate. With tax base harmonisation European multinationals would save on compliance costs, and national differentials in statutory tax rates would more accurately reflect differences in effective tax rates, increasing the transparency of corporate tax systems. At the same time Member
States could still compete over statutory tax rates, thus preserving an important element of national sovereignty in tax policy.
Against this background our second scenario assumes full harmonisation of corporate tax bases across the EU25. This policy package is identical to the full harmonisation scenario with respect to harmonisation of tax bases, but leaves statutory tax rates at their current levels. Again, the tax bases are calculated as two different (unweighted and GDP-weighted) averages of the current tax bases.
Enhanced Cooperation
Enhanced In our scenario with Enhanced Cooperation, we therefore assume that tax bases as well as tax rates are harmonised at the unweighted or weighted average levels prevailing across the Euro countries only, leaving tax rates and tax bases in the other EU Member States at their current levels.
The method of finance
Tax coordination will generally affect the total public revenue collected by Member States. In order to isolate the 'pure' effects of tax coordination, most of our analysis will assume that long-run government budget balance is maintained through adjustment of (lump-sum) income transfers to households. However, to illustrate the importance of the marginal source of public finance, we will also study the effects of full harmonisation when tax rates on labour income are adjusted to balance the public budget.
Effects of tax coordination on economic activity, public revenue and consumer welfare
Two factors explain the majority of the economic effects of corporate tax harmonisation. First, harmonisation of both tax rates and tax bases reduces crosscountry differences in effective tax rates, leading to a more efficient allocation of capital within the EU as corporate taxes no longer drive a wedge between the marginal productivity of capital in the different Member States. The aggregate EUwide gain from a more efficient capital allocation may be seen as the pure valueadded from tax coordination. Note that while such a gain will always arise under full harmonisation, it may not materialize under tax base harmonisation, because the latter scenario will not necessarily reduce cross-country differences in effective corporate tax rates.
Second, in all scenarios where the public budget is balanced through adjustment of public transfers, corporate tax harmonisation will increase the tax burden in some countries and reduce it in other countries. The policy changes required can be very significant. Individual country results are primarily influenced by the change in the overall tax burden. A higher tax burden leads to higher tax revenues but causes a loss in GDP due to increased distortions. Conversely, a lower tax burden generates a drop in tax revenue and a gain in GDP stemming from greater economic efficiency. The aggregate effect of changes to the total level of taxation often dominates the effect of a more efficient allocation of capital. Large shifts in total tax revenues will in many cases lead to large shifts in GDP. This means that economic gains from tax coordination cannot be taken for granted. Depending on the specific details of coordination policies and the set of cooperating countries, aggregate gains can be reversed into aggregate losses. The details of policy reform matter, as will be shown in the following sections.
Aggregate effects of tax coordination
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the EU-wide effects of tax coordination in the two cases of harmonisation at unweighted and weighted averages, respectively. EUwide harmonisation (both full and base harmonisation) leads to gains in both GDP and welfare. 11 Harmonisation at unweighted averages leads to a significant drop in tax revenues. As explained above, the aggregate effect of changes to the total level of taxation can often dominate the effects of a more efficient allocation of capital. In the case of full harmonisation at the weighted average tax rate and base, GDP and welfare are seen to increase by almost 0.4% and 0.1%, respectively, while aggregate tax revenue for the EU25 is virtually constant. The aggregate gains in both GDP and welfare are indicative of the positive effect of a more efficient capital allocation, and can be thought of as the pure benefit from tax coordination.
It may seem surprising that GDP and welfare move in opposite directions in the case of Enhanced Cooperation. However, the two variables need not move in parallel, since an increase in GDP requires an increase in factor inputs which is costly in terms of welfare, and since GDP and national income may be decoupled because changes in net capital flows generate changes in income from net foreign assets. For example, consider a country that allows strongly accelerated depreciation so that even investments with a very low pre-tax rate of return are profitable. If such a country is forced to reduce its capital allowance rate as a consequence of tax harmonisation, domestic investment and GDP will tend to fall, but national income and welfare may increase, since a larger fraction of national savings will be invested in the international capital market rather than being used to finance low-productive domestic investment.
The relatively modest magnitude of the welfare gains in Figures 1 and 2 is explained by the continued existence of other tax distortions to the cross-country pattern of saving and investment within the EU (see Sørensen, 2004a) . Tax rules for household and institutional investors still differ across Member States. In particular, the taxation of corporate source income at the shareholder level continues to differ across countries. Investors are furthermore home-biased in their decision making, which reduces the substitutability of assets. Moreover, a significant part of total capital stocks is invested outside the corporate sector, particularly in housing capital.
Corporate tax harmonisation alone is therefore not enough to equalize the cost of capital across the EU.
Effects of tax harmonisation on individual Member States
Though the aggregate effects of tax coordination are quite modest at the EU level, individual country effects are large and divergent, as illustrated in Table 3 , which considers the scenario with full harmonisation at unweighted averages. The table shows that individual countries will experience sizeable changes in economic activity and tax revenues. Two conclusions emerge. First, harmonisation of the corporate tax base implies very large changes to the rules determining taxable corporate income in some countries. In particular, Germany is an outlier in the EU15 because of its narrow tax base. Second, for almost all countries, a gain in GDP comes at the cost of lower tax revenues. Conversely, a loss in GDP is generally accompanied by higher tax revenues. As previously noted, this is because changes in the level of distortionary taxation tend to outweigh all other effects at the country level when government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers to offset changes in tax revenues. This analysis highlights some fundamental dilemmas for any policy of tax harmonisation. On the one hand harmonisation cannot generate any aggregate efficiency gain from an improved allocation of capital unless national tax systems differ from the outset. On the other hand these initial differences in national tax policies inevitably mean that tax harmonisation creates losers as well as winners. As long as decisions on EU tax harmonisation require unanimity among the Member States, it is thus inconceivable that any agreement could be reached without some kind of compensating transfers from the winning to the losing countries.
But this points to another dilemma: Any compensation scheme must identify winners and losers. If losers are defined as those countries where tax revenues fall as a result of harmonisation, the implication would be that countries suffering drops in GDP (and welfare) would compensate countries with gains in GDP (and welfare). If, on the other hand, losers are defined as those countries where GDP decreases as a result of the reforms, the implication would be that countries suffering drops in tax revenues would compensate countries with gains in tax revenues. Both options will prove hard to accept for policy makers.
A further dilemma arises from the fact that the (sometimes significant) changes in Member State revenues implied by tax harmonisation can hardly be absorbed without a noticeable impact on the internal distribution of income and welfare within Member States. Presumably, this makes tax harmonisation even more controversial.
Enhanced Cooperation versus full harmonisation
The analysis above suggests that although the aggregate efficiency gain from tax harmonisation will be smaller, the gain will be less unevenly distributed the greater the similarity between the initial national tax systems. Moreover, harmonisation will generate savings on compliance and administration costs that are not included in our model analysis, 12 and these gains will be shared by all countries engaging in harmonisation. Because of the more equal distribution of gains, it seems more likely that a more homogeneous group of countries like the members of the euro zone could reach an agreement on tax harmonisation. This is the rationale for considering the effects of Enhanced Cooperation involving corporate tax harmonisation within the euro zone.
Figures 3 and 4 confirm that the dispersion of the net gains from harmonisation of tax rates as well as tax bases would indeed be smaller within the euro zone than within the EU25. However, the difference in the degree of dispersion is seen to be relatively small, and the simulations underlying Figures 3 and 4 reveal that the difference between harmonisation at the unweighted or weighted average corporate tax rate and tax base is more pronounced in the case of Enhanced
Cooperation, compared to the scenario with full harmonisation. In case of Enhanced Cooperation for the euro zone, harmonisation at unweighted averages tends to imply losses in GDP and gains in tax revenues, whereas harmonisation at weighted averages yields opposite results. The differences are to a large extent driven by individual country impacts, most notably by the impact on Germany, which has the largest economy in the EU.
As previously noted, the German economy is an outlier in the sense that the tax base is very narrow compared to other EU15 Member States. When harmonisation takes place at the unweighted average tax rate and tax base, the German tax base is drastically increased, leading to a sharp increase in the total corporate tax burden and an accompanying fall in economic activity. Because Germany constitutes around one fifth of the total EU economy, this effect has a strong impact on the results for Enhanced Cooperation at unweighted averages.
Against this background, harmonisation at the weighted average tax rate and base may seem a tempting alternative for Enhanced Cooperation, since it involves a smaller dispersion of the effects of harmonisation. However, such a scenario implies that the rules for determining the harmonised tax base must be heavily oriented towards replicating the effects of German tax legislation.
Tax base harmonisation versus full harmonisation
The economic effects of tax base harmonisation are conceptually different from full harmonisation. When only the tax base is harmonised, substantial differences in effective corporate tax rates will remain. In fact, if countries with relatively broad tax bases tend to have relatively low tax rates, and vice versa, tax base harmonisation may lead to an increase in effective tax rate differences. The implication is that cross-country distortions to investment decisions may remain or even increase, thereby eliminating any gains from the improved capital allocation that follows full harmonisation.
Still, tax base harmonisation can result in economic gains as illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . The gains in GDP and welfare are primarily a result of the overall drop in taxation. The decrease in tax revenues is the effect of harmonising only one of the two components determining corporate tax revenues (the other component is the statutory tax rate). Specifically, the drop in aggregate revenue reflects that it is mainly the small EU countries which are forced to broaden their tax bases whereas most of the large Member States (except Germany) must increase their capital allowance rates. When government budgets are balanced by adjusting income transfers, lower taxation increases investment and economic activity.
As was the case for full harmonisation, individual country effects are significantly larger than the aggregate effect for the EU as a whole. There are still clear winners and losers from harmonisation, and the span between the biggest positive and negative outcome is considerable (see Tables A.3 Table 3 implicitly also provides insights into the issue of compliance costs.
The large adjustments to tax bases that sometimes are required by harmonisation indicate that existing rules for calculating taxable corporate income differ significantly across countries. This suggests that tax base harmonisation could result in sizeable reductions in compliance costs. The present study may therefore underestimate the gains from tax coordination. However, as long as statutory tax rate differentials remain, multinationals will have an incentive to engage in international profit-shifting via transfer-pricing, and hence the present complex transfer-pricing regulations will have to be maintained, at least as long as the corporate tax base is allocated across countries by the method of separate accounting. 14 The saving of compliance costs would therefore be smaller under tax base harmonisation than under full harmonisation.
Budget balancing through adjustment of the labour income tax
Coordination of corporate taxes can have substantial effects on tax revenues.
Full harmonisation yields significant revenue gains in some countries and considerable losses in others (see Table 3 ). The large effects imply that corporate tax cooperation is likely to be bundled with reforms of other parts of the tax system.
Most countries lose revenues. If labour income taxes are used instead of income transfers to balance the government budgets, these countries experience smaller gains in GDP and welfare and some even experience a small loss in GDP, as shown in Table 4 .
Some countries, including Germany and Estonia, gain revenues from a full harmonisation of corporate taxation (again, see Table 3 ). The welfare impacts are positive in some cases, e.g. Germany, as the tax system is now less distortionary, and negative in other cases, e.g., Estonia, where distortions have increased. All of these countries experience gains, however, if they use the larger corporate tax revenues to reduce labour income taxes. Unemployment rates decrease accordingly.
The EU as a whole continues to gain from tax coordination if labour income taxes are used to keep government budgets balanced, as shown in Figure 5. 14 In principle the transfer-pricing problem could be solved if the corporate tax base were apportioned by a fixed formula, as proposed by the European Commission (2001a). However, formula apportionment has its own problems, as discussed by Sørensen (2004a) . 
A summary comparison of policy scenarios
This section provides summary tables with results from the different scenarios. Table 5 compares full harmonisation to tax base harmonisation, assuming that coordination involves all of the EU25 countries. The table shows that full harmonisation at weighted averages is the most attractive policy option for corporate tax coordination if the overall level of taxation is to be kept unchanged for the EU as a whole. Larger gains can be achieved only by lower (effective) tax rates resulting in lower tax revenues. The picture is a bit more complex for the case of Enhanced Cooperation, but the basic policy conclusion remains the same. We have so far assumed that Enhanced Cooperation would involve full harmonisation of tax bases and tax rates within the euro zone, but the euro countries might of course choose to cooperate only on tax base harmonisation. Figure 6 illustrates the difference between these alternatives. The figure shows that only full harmonisation at weighted averages consistently results in both GDP and welfare gains. In summary, it appears that full harmonisation of both the corporate tax rate and the corporate tax base, at the weighted averages of current rates and bases, is the most interesting option from an economic point of view. As previously noted, this is because full harmonisation at weighted averages comes closest to realizing the benefits from improved capital allocation without affecting the level of taxation.
Conclusions and caveats
This study offers new insights into the issue of corporate tax coordination in the European Union. In particular, it suggests that the aggregate efficiency gains from corporate tax harmonisation are likely to be rather small, because many important forms of saving and investment outside the corporate sector would continue to be subject to widely diverging national tax rules, just as personal tax rates on corporate source income would continue to differ. Indeed, according to the estimates presented in Sørensen (2001) , the efficiency gain from a full harmonisation of all taxes on capital income in the EU could be about four times as large as the estimated gain from corporate tax harmonisation in the present study.
This underscores the importance of allowing for the fact that the corporation tax is only one component in the wider complex of capital income taxes.
Moreover, our study points to some fundamental dilemmas raised by any policy involving full or partial harmonisation of national corporate tax systems. The allocation gains from harmonisation arise because national tax systems differ from the outset, but these very differences also imply that some countries are bound to The unanimity rule for tax policy decisions implies that all countries have an equal say. Given the general tendency of governments to favour national sovereignty on corporate taxation, the unanimity rule makes harmonisation at a level close to the unweighted average of current systems most relevant.
Harmonisation at the weighted average of current tax rates and tax bases implies that large economies are given more influence in determining the harmonised tax base and tax rate. The present study suggests that this makes more economic sense, but it also implies a larger dent in the national sovereignty of small Member States, representing yet another dilemma for tax coordination.
Although the choice of the specific level of harmonisation may seem a purely technical issue, the policy implications are profound. Our study reveals a large difference between harmonisation at the unweighted and weighted averages of current corporate tax rates and bases. For Enhanced Cooperation on full harmonisation, the difference is a question of either aggregate gains or aggregate losses. Enhanced Cooperation involving a smaller and more homogeneous group of countries may therefore be preferred because of the need for very specific agreements on the details of tax coordination.
The present study has focused on the static allocative gains from eliminating existing corporate tax differentials within the EU. It suggests that these gains will be rather small. However, tax harmonisation may create other types of gain that are not included in our analysis.
First, harmonisation will reduce the costs of tax compliance and tax administration, as we have already mentioned. Second, even if there were no initial differences in national tax systems and hence no potential efficiency gain from a better cross-country allocation of capital, tax coordination might still generate a welfare gain by eliminating corporate tax competition among EU Member States. In particular, many scholars have emphasized that tax competition will tend to cause an under-provision of public goods or an undesirable shift of the tax burden from capital to labour. 15 On the other hand, many observers and policy makers have argued that tax competition has the beneficial effect of improving public sector efficiency. But even if this is the case, some amount of tax coordination (e.g. a required minimum effective corporate tax rate) is still likely to be welfare-improving by offsetting the tendency towards underprovision of public goods, as shown by Eggert and Sørensen (2006) .
Third, and related to the previous point, unfettered tax competition may also constrain the ability of governments to engage in redistributive taxation. For egalitarian governments, the resulting increase in inequality may entail a social welfare cost which could be avoided through tax coordination (see Sørensen (2004c) for an attempt to quantify this type of gain from coordination). Again, our analysis does not account for such an effect of tax coordination.
Still, by pointing to some fundamental dilemmas for international tax coordination, the present study may help to explain why EU Member States have been so reluctant to cooperate on tax policy. 
Appendix: Detailed tables
